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I. Introduction 
A partial ist of the proposed constraints on government size includes balanced 
budget rules, tax reduction, fiscal decentralization a d privatization. 1 Privati- 
zation transfers programs from the public sector to the private sector and has 
received great enthusiasm from many critics of growing government. This 
paper examines the ability of privatization efforts to control government size. 
2. Model of privatization government size relation 
Two themes appear in the literature that suggest that privatization is effective 
in both economic and political arenas for shrinking government. The first 
theme is that it produces macro-output gains in a world characterized by 
budget-maximizing bureaucrats. 2 From research which finds that private 
production is more efficient han public production, substitution of produc- 
tion from budget-maximizing bureaucrats oprofit-maximizing firms is argued 
to increase resource allocational efficiency. 3 The second theme is that it solves 
the special interest problem since it "gives" tangible goods to constituents at 
the same time as it reduces government spending. Through tax incentives, 
regulatory changes and asset-sales, privatization is argued to draw constituent 
support hat counters pecial interests. 
I assume that privatization includes only " load shedding," where govern- 
ment eliminates all responsibility for an activity. "Contracting-out" and 
"vouchers" retain some degree of government control. Missing from the liter- 
ature is what effect privatization exerts on the government's ability to spend. 4
Consistent with Friedman (i978), governments are assumed to "spend what 
they receive plus what other else they can get away with. ''5 The total resources 
government consumes are given by the following short-term operating con- 
straint: R T + D, where R total funding level, T tax level and D 
net debt issue. Setting expenditures E equal to the sum of funding sources, 
government consumes what government receives: E R. To lower govern- 
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ment size, privatization must shrink the sum total of all funding outlets. 6 This 
requires that revenues funding newly-privatized services not be re-channelled 
into funding a new program or widening an existing program. Unless that 
funding is removed from the budget, privatization does not unambiguously 
shrink government size. 
3. Privatization as rent-selling 
Some argue that privatization i Great Britain has been successful. 7 Success is 
often attributed to two related evices: (1) offering discounted prices on asset- 
sales and (2) offering tax incentives to foster the demand for privatization. For 
example, discounts of up to 50% have been offered for public housing in Great 
Britain. This uggests hat its success i  related to the offering of deep discounts 
(bribes) which represent income redistribution policy. The larger the discount, 
the larger the redistribution. 
This aspect of privatization appears to represent cases of rent-seeking by 
constituents, or rent-selling by politicians. The quid pro quo arrangement is 
clear: politicians trade votes for deeply-discounted housing. Assuming that 
privatization does not eliminate the funds backing newly-privatized goods, 
public funds are released that may fund new programs or expand existing pro- 
grams. In this light, privatization offers the politician greater ability to rent-sell 
and a new means of redistributing income without imposing any new funding 
constraint on government. Privatization may allow politicians to unload old 
favors (via selling government assets, such as public housing, at discounted 
prices) and gain funds for new favors. Asset-sales may temporarily expand 
budget constraints and spending. 
4. Conclusion 
A budget constraint view of government shows that privatization need not alter 
spending when it is implemented without a rule forbidding re-use of the fund- 
ing backing newly-privatized programs. Only when these funds are eliminated 
from the budget process (e.g., tax rebates or permanent deficit reduction) can 
these funds not back new programs or expand existing programs. This is an im- 
portant caveat since privatization proposals do not contain such rules. With 
such rules, privatization can increase allocational efficiency and lead to smaller 
government size. 
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Notes 
1. See Buchanan and Wagner (1977) for balanced budget rules; Friedman (1978) and Marlow and 
Orzechowski (1988) for tax reduction; Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980) for fiscal decentrali- 
zation and Savas (1982), Butler (1985) and President's Commission on Privatization (1988) for 
privatization. 
2. See Miller and Moe (1983) for a discussion of this argument. 
3. For example, see Ahlbrandt (1973) and DeAllesi (1974) for studies comparing the efficiency- 
differences between private and public productions. 
4. Butler (1985: 9) argues that a major reason for why the Reagan Administration had failed to 
permanently lower government size was due to " . . .  obsolete weaponary. The initial and fun- 
damental mistake of the administration was its assumption that the only way to contol and cut 
the budget is to seek legislation to reduce the supply of dollars flowing out of Washington... 
The fatal flaw in this supply-side view of the budget process i  that it ignores the demand side 
of the political equation . . .  A new strategy is needed." 
5. The so-called "tax-spend" hypothesis the subject of many studies. Manage and Marlow 
(1986), Blackley (1986), Marlow and Manage (1987), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1987) and Ram (1988) 
provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis. Anderson et al. (1986) provide evidence 
that the causal direction isin the other direction and von Furstenburg etal. (1986) find evidence 
of no relation. 
6. Note that these funding outlets include inflation which is just one of many forms of taxation. 
That is, R is equal to the sum of excise, income, consumption, inflation . . .  taxes. 
7. Butler (1985) argues that by offering discounts of up to 50% of market value, the Conservatives 
outbid the Labour Party for key elements of the public housing coalition. During 1979-84, 
more than 500,000 units had been sold at discount to tenants. 
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